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Introduction 
In December 2009, more than 25,000 people converged on Copenhagen’s Bella Center 
for the United Nations Climate Change Conference, COP-15. They came together to 
discuss the international response to climate change, to try and influence the discussions, 
or to observe or report on them. Among the participants were 120 Heads of State 
empowered to act on behalf of their citizens, supported by delegations of Ministers and 
bureaucrats. Dimitrov (2010: 18) contends that COP-15 brought together ‘the highest 
concentration of robust decision-making power the world had seen.’ 
 
Yet this unprecedented gathering of global decision-makers was unable to deliver an 
effective global response to climate change. The Copenhagen Accord that emerged from 
COP-15 was not legally binding and was not formally adopted under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. While climate scientists warn that the rise 
in global average temperatures must be kept to less than 2° C to avoid dangerous 
climate change (Allison et al. 2009; Rockström et al. 2009), and this is the stated goal 
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of the Copenhagen Accord, the pledges contained in the Accord are not sufficient to 
prevent global average temperatures from rising by more than 2° C (Dimitrov 2010; 
Rogelj et al. 2010) and perhaps as high as 3.5° C (Kartha 2010). The subsequent United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, COP-16, gave formal status to the 
Copenhagen Accord but did not make it legally binding or increase its emission 
reduction ambition. 
 
The outcome of COP-15 fuelled existing debates about the ability of current systems of 
international governance to satisfactorily respond to global challenges like climate 
change. There is a large and diverse body of literature proposing normative global 
governance systems. Some, like James Lovelock (Hickman 2010), propose more 
authoritarian responses to environmental challenges. Frustrated with the performance of 
the United Nations, some propose the replacement of multilateral negotiations with an 
exclusive ‘minilateralism’ (Naim 2009), reducing the number of negotiating nations to a 
smaller set, such as the Group of Twenty (G20) or major emitters. Others see the 
extension of market mechanisms delivering more effective global governance of climate 
change (Pearce 2008; Stripple 2010). Still others are committed to democratisation of 
global governance, through the institutionalisation of cosmopolitan philosophy (Held 
2009), establishment of frameworks for earth system governance (Biermann 2007; 
Biermann et al. 2010), reform of the United Nations (Figueres 2007), development of 
new global representative bodies (Raskin & Xercavins 2010) or the promotion of global 
deliberative politics (Dryzek 2006, 2011; Bohman 2010; Dryzek & Stevenson 2011). 
 
In this paper, our focus is on the potential contribution of deliberative democracy to 
more effective—and more democratic—global environmental governance. The 
‘deliberative turn’ in democratic theory has ‘put communication and reflection at the 
center of democracy’ so that democracy ‘is not just about the making of decisions 
through the aggregation of preferences’ but ‘also about processes of judgment and 
preference formation and transformation within informed, respectful, and competent 
dialogue’ (Dryzek 2011: 3). Thus deliberative democracy puts talking, rather than 
voting, at the heart of democracy (Chambers 2003). In addition to an expanding body of 
normative theory on deliberative democracy, there is also growing empirical and 
practical experience with its application to environmental governance (e.g. Backstrand 
et al. 2010) and with the design and implementation of temporary deliberative 
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institutions (Fung 2003; Chambers 2009; Smith, G 2009; Dryzek 2011). The latter are 
often discrete, facilitated events that bring together relatively small numbers of ordinary 
citizens to deliberate, typically on issues that are controversial or defy more 
conventional decision-making processes. Fung (2003) calls these deliberative events 
mini-publics; they include diverse techniques such as deliberative polls, citizens’ juries 
and consensus conferences, often involving randomly selected citizens (Smith, G. 2009). 
 
Mini-publics offer a practical means to investigate the conditions for facilitating 
deliberation but the contribution of discrete mini-publics to the normative goal of 
creating a more deliberative democracy remains uncertain (Chambers 2009; Dryzek 
2011). Chambers (2009) argues that an exclusive focus on such discrete deliberative 
initiatives risks abandonment of larger questions about how civil society relates to the 
state. Dryzek (2011) is generally supportive of mini-publics but locates them within 
large-scale political systems where they may or may not contribute to the emergence of 
more deliberative systems. Our intent in this paper is to examine the role that 
deliberative mini-publics can play in facilitating the emergence of a global deliberative 
system for climate change response. We pursue this intent through a reflective 
evaluation of the Australian component of the World Wide Views on Global Warming 
project (WWViews). 
 
WWViews was an ambitious attempt to democratise COP-15 by giving people from 
around the world an opportunity to deliberate on international climate policy and to 
make recommendations to the delegations meeting in Copenhagen. The Danish Board 
of Technology (DBT) and the Danish Cultural Institute (DCI) initiated the project as a 
way of feeding public deliberative opinion into national and international climate 
change decision-making processes (Danish Board of Technology 2009b). Held on 26 
September 2009, with roughly 4,000 participants across 38 countries, WWViews was 
the first attempt to create a deliberative mini-public at a global scale. The Australian 
WWViews event brought 100 randomly selected citizens from across Australia to 
Sydney to deliberate for a day and a half. 
 
As an example of a deliberative mini-public, WWViews provides an opportunity to 
reflect on theoretical concerns about the role of mini-publics in furthering the cause of 
deliberative democracy. Further, as a global mini-public, WWViews potentially reveals 
new challenges for deliberative democratisation of global governance systems. 
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Therefore, the objective of our evaluation is to draw out lessons for the design of future 
mini-publics, particularly at a global scale. 
 
We reflect on WWViews from the perspective of one of the National Partners in 
WWViews, responsible for organising the Australian WWViews event. As such, it is 
not our intention to evaluate the entire WWViews project across all of the participating 
countries. Instead, we evaluate the Australian event and our partial experiences of the 
international project. We do not provide detailed descriptions of the project and its 
outcomes, except where these are needed to support our evaluation. Full reports on the 
Australian WWViews event (Atherton & Herriman 2009) and the global WWViews 
project (Danish Board of Technology 2009b) are available to interested readers.1 
 
Normative characteristics of deliberative systems 
To reflect on the contribution of WWViews we first need to establish an evaluative 
framework. To do this we reflect on existing evaluative frameworks for public 
participation processes in general and deliberative events in particular, and existing 
approaches to assessing the deliberativeness of socio-political systems. From this we 
draw a set of evaluative criteria to apply to this case. 
 
Evaluative frameworks for public participation processes (e.g. Burton 2009; Rowe & 
Frewer 2004; Rowe & Frewer 2000) and sets of principles for community engagement 
(International Conference on Engaging Communities 2005; NCDD 2009) are readily 
available. However, few of these frameworks and principles specifically draw attention 
to the quality of deliberation. One exception is the Brisbane Declaration of the 
International Conference on Engaging Communities, which identifies integrity, 
inclusion, deliberation and influence as the core principles of community engagement 
(International Conference on Engaging Communities 2005). Drawing on Carson and 
Hartz-Karp (2005: 122) and the text of the Brisbane Declaration, these principles can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
• Integrity: There should be ‘openness and honesty about the scope and purpose of engagement’ 
(International Conference on Engaging Communities 2005). 
• Inclusion: The process should be representative of the population and inclusive of diverse 
viewpoints and values, providing equal opportunity for all to participate. 
• Deliberation: The process should provide open dialogue, access to information, respect, space to 
                                                
1 Additional information can be found at the Australian (http://wwviews.org.au) and international 
(http://wwviews.org) websites. 
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understand and reframe issues, and movement toward consensus. 
• Influence: The process should have the ability to influence policy and decision-making. 
 
These principles provide a useful starting point for evaluating WWViews as a 
community engagement process. However, more specific literature on the normative 
characteristics of deliberative processes helps to flesh out these principles, particularly 
the latter three. 
 
Edwards et al. (2008) offer a more detailed evaluation framework, developed 
specifically for deliberative events. They propose and apply 37 evaluation criteria 
covering inputs (for example, diversity of participants, training for facilitators), process 
(covering quality of dialogue, participant knowledge and logistics) and outputs (i.e. new 
discourses and networks developed, and influence over policy). The criteria align well 
with the four principles above but provide more detailed questions to ask when 
evaluating a deliberative process, like WWViews.  
 
We believe that these evaluative frameworks are more useful for our current purposes 
when considered within the context of a normative deliberative system. Mansbridge 
(1999) introduced the idea of a deliberative system that stretches beyond any single 
deliberative event and Dryzek (2009, 2011) developed a generally applicable scheme 
for analysing deliberative systems comprising: 
 
• Public space, ideally allowing free communication with few barriers or legal restrictions on what 
can be said. Designed citizen forums like WWViews occur in public space, as does media 
commentary, political activism, public consultation and informal conversation. For discussions 
on global climate change response, global civil society provides an important deliberative arena 
within public space (Brassett & Smith, W 2010). 
• Empowered space, ‘home to deliberation among actors in institutions clearly producing 
collective decisions’ (Dryzek 2011: 11). These institutions can be formal or informal and include 
legislatures, cabinets, courts, or international negotiations like those at COP-15. 
• Transmission refers to ‘some means through which deliberation in public space can influence 
that in empowered space’ (Dryzek 2011: 11). Transmission can occur through advocacy, 
criticism, questioning, support or other means.  
• Accountability, ‘whereby empowered space answers to public space’ (Dryzek 2011: 11). 
Elections are one form of accountability and others can occur through public consultation 
processes or simply giving a public account that justifies decisions. 
• Meta-deliberation, ‘or deliberation about how the deliberative system itself should be organized’ 
(Dryzek 2011: 12). Dryzek argues that a healthy deliberative system should have the capacity for 
self-examination and potentially self-transformation. 
• Decisiveness captures the idea that a functioning deliberative system should be able to make 
collective decisions that are responsive to the other five elements. 
 
Bohman (2010a) draws further attention to the elements of a deliberative system when 
he argues that both communicative freedom and communicative power are essential to 
democratisation. Communicative freedom ‘is the exercise of a communicative status, 
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the status of being recognised as a member of the public. Communicative freedom is 
transformed into communicative power when it is incorporated into institutionalised 
processes of decision making’ (Bohman 2010a: 432). Communicative freedom is an 
aspect of Dryzek’s public space and the existence of mini-publics is a testament to 
communicative freedom. However, the transformation of communicative freedom into 
communicative power is very challenging. Dryzek identifies mechanisms of 
transmission and accountability through which communicative power could be 
developed but says little about how citizens in public space can accumulate the power to 
effectively use these mechanisms. Thus issues of power need to be taken into account in 
our evaluative framework.  
 
Dryzek (2011) argues that a system has deliberative capacity to the extent that it can 
accommodate deliberation that is authentic, inclusive and consequential. Deliberation is 
authentic if it is ‘able to induce reflection upon preferences in noncoercive fashion and 
involve communicating in terms that those who do not share one’s point of view can 
find meaningful and accept’ (Dryzek 2011: 10). This notion of authenticity adds a new 
dimension to the principle of deliberation from the Brisbane Declaration above. 
Dryzek’s (2011) other two criteria, inclusivity and consequentiality, align closely with 
the principles of inclusion and influence respectively from the Brisbane Declaration. 
However, Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010: 43) point out that deliberative democracy ‘can 
entail the representation of discourses as well as persons, interests, or groups’ and 
inclusion of diverse discourses may be as or more important than demographic 
representation (although demographic representation remains important for both 
procedural fairness (Brackertz & Meredyth, 2008: 11) and as a way to deliver diversity 
of discourse). This leads to a richer understanding of the principle of inclusion. 
 
Following on from the above discussion, our evaluation of WWViews will proceed in 
two stages. First, we will situate WWViews as a component within a normative global 
deliberative system for decision-making on climate change. Second, we will evaluate 
WWViews against four principles that integrate the above sources: 
 
• Integrity: the origins and purpose of the deliberative process should be transparent and the 
process should be adequately resourced and respectfully facilitated without any attempt to 
influence the outcomes. 
• Inclusion: The process should be representative of the affected population and their diverse 
discourses and provide equal opportunity for all to participate. 
• Authentic deliberation: The process should support communicative freedom by providing access 
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to information, space for open and respectful dialogue between participants and sufficient time 
for reflection. It should encourage but not coerce reflection on preferences. 
• Influence and consequence: The process should develop the communicative power to make a 
difference, whether by influencing policy and decision-making or facilitating broader 
sociocultural change (e.g. new discourses or networks). 
 
These four principles capture a normative ideal for a deliberative mini-public. As others 
have pointed out (Backstrand et al. 2010a), real practice inevitably falls short of the 
deliberative ideal, yet these principles do provide a useful evaluative vantage point for 
suggesting future progress towards such an ideal. 
 
WWViews in a global deliberative system 
Dryzek’s (2009) conception of a deliberative system was first published in April 2009, 
when the WWViews process had already been designed. Consequently, the organisers 
around the world did not have the benefit of this thinking and terminology to 
conceptualise how WWViews could contribute to a deliberative global system. What 
follows, then, is not intended as criticism of the project for failing to apply this concept 
but an attempt to use this emerging concept to open up a broader conversation about the 
future of global mini-publics. We analyse WWViews as an element within a global 
deliberative system, which helps to both explain what WWViews sought to achieve and 
to highlight the challenges it and future mini-publics face. 
 
Public space 
The global WWViews project brought together 44 separate mini-publics in 
simultaneous events run by local organisations in 38 participating countries.2 Each event 
involved around 100 participants and together the events brought together a global mini-
public of more than 4,000 people. Although the DBT and DCI provided global 
coordination of the project, the national implementation was the responsibility of 
partner organisations in each country, which were typically universities or non-
government organisations with interest in citizen engagement and democracy. 
 
WWViews took place in public space as an exercise in communicative freedom—a 
response to the perception of a democratic gap between citizens and policymakers and a 
need to involve citizens more directly in deliberation on global climate change policy 
                                                
2 Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium (Flanders), Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, 
Chinese Taipei, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Saint Lucia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, The Maldives, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, USA, and Vietnam. 
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(Danish Board of Technology 2009b). It did not have any formal decision-making status 
itself but sought to exert influence on decision-makers. As an exercise within global 
public space, WWViews entered into a clamorous climate policy debate, populated by 
multiple competing discourses (Dryzek 2011). Some of the challenges for mini-publics 
in such a crowded public space include being heard at all, and being seen as a legitimate 
voice of global civil society. This latter challenge is particularly difficult given the 
diverse discourses that play out within global civil society (Brassett & Smith 2010). 
 
Empowered space 
According to the Danish Board of Technology (2009: 10), the ‘target groups for 
receiving the WWViews results are politicians, negotiators and interest groups engaged 
in the UN climate negotiations leading up to COP15 and beyond.’ The empowered 
space addressed here is a complex one, comprising decision-making bodies such as 
parliaments and cabinets within nation-states and formal and informal negotiations 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
 
WWViews sought to influence this empowered space in multiple ways, outlined in 
more detail below. We believe, however, that the project did not develop sufficient 
understanding of the mechanisms of this empowered space. For example, despite long 
lead-time in planning the global project, all of the WWViews deliberative events were 
scheduled to take place only two months before COP-15, when negotiating positions for 
many countries had already firmed. Earlier engagement with empowered space at 
national scales could have increased the potential to influence negotiating positions. 
Instead, there was a strong emphasis on influencing the negotiations themselves, which 
was perhaps an unrealistic goal given that negotiators would have limited flexibility to 
alter their position at COP-15 based on their mandate from national empowered space. 
 
Transmission 
The organisers of WWViews were very aware that a mini-public can only influence 
empowered space if it works to develop a means of transmission to empowered space. 
Consequently, much effort was put into development of dissemination strategies in each 
participating country. In Australia, we sought to influence government decision makers 
by engaging them directly with the results and process, and also sought to influence 
policy indirectly by introducing new discourses into public space. The dissemination 
strategy had three components: 
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• Political engagement strategy: engaging directly with politicians and policy makers through 
meetings and provision of reports, and supporting participant outreach to politicians. The goal 
was to influence politicians and policy makers to at least reflect on their own positions and 
perhaps adopt positions more consistent with those expressed by the mini-public. 
• Media and communications strategy: use of a website, media releases, social media and direct 
contacts with journalists to increase media coverage of WWViews and introduce the positions 
expressed by the participants into public debate. This was accompanied by a strategy of 
communications that engaged directly (via project newsletters and invitations to become 
involved) with key stakeholders such as environment NGOs, senior bureaucrats and businesses. 
The goal was to disseminate a new discourse that could shift the public debate and increase 
pressure on decision-makers within empowered space to deliberate on their positions. 
• Research strategy: this included critical reflection on WWViews and provision of information 
about the WWViews process to business leaders, teaching and learning institutions, 
professionals from varied fields, researchers, and citizens. The aim here was not to influence 
empowered space on climate change policy but to build awareness of deliberative mini-publics 
so that others might consider this kind of approach in the future. 
 
The success of this transmission strategy will be considered in a later section. Here, it is 
sufficient to point out that the conversion of communicative freedom into 
communicative power is difficult for a mini-public operating with limited resources in a 
crowded public space. 
 
Accountability 
Following on from this last point, a mini-public convened in public space has few 
avenues to hold empowered space to account. Elections are the main accountability 
mechanism in liberal democracies and politicians are unlikely to feel that the views of a 
mini-public convened on a single issue are going to make much difference to the 
choices of the voting public. Mini-publics often turn to other forms of accountability, 
such as asking decision-makers to ‘give an account’ of how they will respond to the 
views of the mini-public. 
 
We were not able to persuade any Australian politicians to accept the results from 
WWViews and make a statement on how they would respond. We did, however, obtain 
a letter and video message endorsing the event, prior to it being held, from the Federal 
Minister for Climate Change and Water, Penny Wong. In addition, Australia’s Climate 
Change Ambassador, Louise Hand, spoke in person at the event. This association of 
politicians with a mini-public opens up the potential to hold them accountable through 
the public sphere, by pointing out their support for the event and drawing their attention 
publicly to the results. Nevertheless, this is a weak and tenuous form of accountability 
and establishment of reliable accountability mechanisms is perhaps the single biggest 
challenge for mini-publics contributing to the development a deliberative system. 
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Meta-deliberation 
There was no significant reflection in advance about the role of WWViews in 
facilitating the establishment of a broader deliberative system, except for the optimistic 
intent that holding a global, linked series of events would raise the profile of citizen 
deliberation and highlight its potential benefit to policy makers and citizens. This intent 
was mirrored in the Australian event in which organisers identified two linked but 
distinct communication messages—the policy preferences of citizens, and the value of 
such processes for future policy making. One of the purposes of this paper is to 
contribute to meta-deliberation about the role of events like WWViews in a normative 
global deliberative system. 
 
Decisiveness 
As Dryzek (2011) points out, the global deliberative system has not been particularly 
decisive in its policy response to climate change, with global emissions continuing to 
rise and a lack of binding commitments to halt this rise. Given the problems of 
transmission and accountability identified above, WWViews offered little to improve 
the decisiveness of the global deliberative system. The position that emerges from 
analysing WWViews as a component in a broader deliberative system is that mini-
publics are excellent examples of Bohman’s communicative freedom but due to 
problems of transmission and accountability they fail to convert that freedom into 
communicative power. In the case of WWViews, it is very difficult to point to any real 
influence of the project on the empowered space that decides on climate change policy. 
We will take up this point again later in the paper. 
 
Evaluating WWViews against norms of deliberative democracy 
Above, we identified integrity, inclusion, authentic deliberation and influence and 
consequence as normative characteristics of deliberative democracy against which to 
evaluate WWViews. This section evaluates WWViews against these norms and 
discusses lessons that emerge. 
 
Integrity 
The origins and purpose of the deliberative process should be transparent and the 
process should be adequately resourced and respectfully facilitated without any attempt 
to influence the outcomes. 
 
The organisers of WWViews in Australia sought to be open, honest and transparent 
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about the objectives of the project, the reasons for involving participants and what the 
project could realistically hope to achieve. Participants were given information prior to 
the event about the kind of process being used, why using this kind of process is 
important, who was responsible for initiating and organising the event and how the 
information about climate change and climate policy provided to participants was 
developed. Participants received information about the purpose of the event through 
newsletters, a website,3 a dedicated participant support person and information packages. 
For example, the second newsletter for the Australian event stated that ‘a full report on 
proceedings will be prepared by ISF and disseminated widely to decision-makers and 
other interested groups in the lead up to COP-15 in December.’ It was also stressed to 
participants that there was no guarantee that the results of the project would influence 
decision-makers at COP-15. 
 
Beyond misrepresentation of the purpose of an event, the main threats to the integrity of 
a mini-public are systematic bias in the information provided to participants or 
facilitation that influences the deliberations in particular directions. To address the first 
threat, the DBT established a rigorous process for developing the information provided 
to participants before and at the event. Participants in all countries received the same 
information—a booklet of background reading material in advance of the event and a 
set of videos shown during the event—translated into local languages. The material was 
based primarily on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fourth 
Assessment Report (IPCC 2007). The DBT established an international Scientific 
Advisory Board to review the information and the material was tested at an early stage 
of its development in citizen focus groups in different parts of the world. Partner 
organisations in each country were not allowed to add to the provided material or 
develop country-specific information for participants. These processes sought to 
eliminate any systematic bias in the information provided to participants. 
 
To minimise the risk of facilitation that would influence the deliberations in a particular 
direction, the DBT sought to recruit partner organisations that were ‘unbiased with 
regards to climate change’ (Danish Board of Technology 2009b). Although the Institute 
for Sustainable Futures is an independent research institute, many of its researchers 
have commented in the public domain on what constitutes an effective response to 
                                                
3 See: http://wwviews.org.au [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011].  
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climate change and taken critical positions against government policy on climate change. 
Therefore, to avoid influencing the views of the participants, the Institute for 
Sustainable Futures and WWF (one of the sponsors) did not take on facilitation roles 
during the event. Instead, a neutral lead facilitator was engaged and volunteer table 
facilitators were drawn from sponsors and other organisations perceived as having a 
more neutral position on the issue of climate change response. Whether the association 
of the Institute for Sustainable Futures and WWF with the event was itself enough to 
influence the deliberation in a particular direction is an open question, and one that we 
did not set out to test in our evaluation.  
 
Evaluating the integrity of an event that you have designed is difficult. However, we can 
point to some evidence that the event did have integrity. First, the Australian results on 
issues such as the urgency of climate change response and the strength of the proposed 
policy responses did not differ substantially or systematically from those in other 
developed countries (Atherton & Herriman 2009; Danish Board of Technology 2009b), 
indicating that the facilitation in Australia did not influence the participants to take a 
stronger position than their international counterparts. Second, the quantitative 
evaluation surveys completed by participants and qualitative feedback comments 
revealed no significant criticism of the way the process was conducted or its objectives. 
To give one quantitative measure from the survey, 98 percent of survey respondents 
agreed that ‘The event used my time productively. 4 Qualitative feedback indicated that 
participants felt the event was a good investment of their time, was well run, followed 
good process and made a meaningful contribution (Atherton & Herriman 2009). 
 
Inclusion 
The process should be representative of the affected population and their diverse 
discourses and provide equal opportunity for all to participate. 
 
WWViews sought to include a representative group of countries in the global project, 
and to include citizens within each country that reflected the demographic distribution 
in that country ‘with regards to age, gender, occupation, education, and geographical 
zone of residency (that is, city and countryside)’ (Danish Board of Technology 2009: 8). 
The DBT (2009: 8) also specified that participants ‘should not be experts on climate 
change, neither as scientists nor stakeholders.’ Beyond these criteria, the DBT left the 
                                                
4 This combines results for the three answer categories: Absolutely agreed; agreed; or somewhat agreed. 
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specific details of participant recruitment to the national partner organisations. 
WWViews did not specifically seek to include a representative set of discourses in the 
deliberations, as advocated by Dryzek (2011), although there was a tacit assumption that 
demographic diversity would deliver discourse diversity. We will start by evaluating 
inclusion within Australia, before broadening to evaluate inclusion at the global scale 
and then considering Dryzek’s challenge to achieve discourse rather than demographic 
representation. 
 
For the Australian WWViews event, Australian citizens were randomly recruited by a 
market research company to match national demographic quotas based on Australian 
Bureau of Statistics data for location, age, gender, ethnicity, income, household 
composition, employment status and education. The market research company 
randomly generated 5,000 telephone numbers and recruited a shortlist of 250 people via 
telephone interviews within this sample. The shortlist of 250 people was sent a complete 
information pack about the event and a Participant Agreement Form that they were 
asked to return if they wanted to participate. From the pool of returns, 110 participants 
were selected to match demographic quotas as closely as possible. On the day of the 
event, 105 participants took part.  
 
Despite operating from a principle of inclusion, the participant recruitment process 
specifically excluded some groups and unintentionally excluded others. Dryzek (2011: 
156) notes a general tendency for mini-publics to ‘disproportionately attract politically 
active, highly educated, high income, and older participants.’ Similarly, Halvorsen 
(2006: 153) finds that public meetings and other community engagement activities 
‘frequently generate viewpoints from a group of people older, whiter, more affluent, 
more educated, and more likely to be male than the citizens within their community.’ 
WWViews Australia was somewhat typical in this respect. 
 
Table 1 summarises the ways in which representation fell short of the demographic 
ideal. First, children under the age of 18 were excluded to simplify permission and 
supervision processes. While this is standard practice in many mini-publics it is not 
ideal, particularly on an issue like climate change that will strongly impact today’s 
young people. As the worst impacts of climate change are projected to occur in the 
future if action is not taken, the children of today have a greater stake in decisions on 
climate change and their voice deserves to be included.  
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For WWViews Australia, the exclusion of children was exacerbated by under-
representation of people aged 18–34. Sarkissian et al. (2009: 134) note that young 
people often don’t become involved in community engagement approaches because 
they find them ‘irrelevant, a waste of time and boring’ and because they do not 
experience results relevant to their concerns. However, it is possible and important to 
find ways to engage youth in mini-publics and various guidelines are available for doing 
so (for example, Ministry of Youth Affairs 2003).  
 
Characteristic Issues 
Geographic 
location 
While all Australian states and territories were represented, including both metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan areas, participants from metropolitan New South Wales (NSW) 
were under-represented (15% of the total compared to the quota of 21%). The event 
was held in Metropolitan NSW (Sydney) and we assumed that participants would want 
to stay with their families rather than in a hotel close to the event, and designed our 
level of reimbursement for these participants accordingly. This lower level of support 
for out-of-pocket expenses may have contributed to under-representation of these 
participants. 
Age Participants under 18 were excluded to simplify permission and supervision processes. 
Participants aged 18-34 were substantially under-represented (19% of the total, 
compared to the quota of 36%) and participants aged 50-64 were over-represented (31% 
of the total compared to the quota of 21%).  
Gender No issues – approximately equal representation of males and females. 
Ethnicity Participants born outside Australia were under-represented (18% of the total compared 
to the quota of 24%). Indigenous Australians were represented in line with the quota. 
Household 
income 
No issues – income bands (from under $20,000 to over $120,000) were appropriately 
represented. 
Household 
composition 
Participants in the “other” household category (which includes, for example, share 
houses) were under-represented (8% of the total compared to a quota of 16%), but 
families with dependent children and couple/single with no dependent children were 
over-represented.  
Work status No issues – different types of work status (working, unemployed, student and retired) 
were appropriately represented. 
Education Participants with highest level of education “some secondary” were under-represented 
(11% compared to the quota of 16%) and participants with highest level of education 
“completed tertiary” were heavily over-represented (41% compared to a quota of 24%). 
 
Table 1: Summary of representation problems for WWViews Australia. 
 
Second, following the instructions provided by the DBT, participants that were 
professionally involved with climate change were excluded. The intention here was to 
ensure participation by ordinary citizens in a non-partisan forum and avoid a repeat of 
the partisan debates already prevalent on climate change. Partisan deliberation has 
different characteristics to non-partisan deliberation and is generally less able to achieve 
quality deliberation (Hendriks, Dryzek & Hunold 2007). In a random selection process 
like that used in Australia, exclusion of climate change experts is unnecessary, as few 
would be recruited and they would have little opportunity to unduly influence the 
deliberations. However, some of the other participating countries used processes other 
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than random selection to recruit participants and these processes could have been more 
open to dominance by partisan stakeholders if such stakeholders were not excluded. 
 
Third, the recruitment process itself inevitably leads to exclusion of some groups of 
citizens. People not listed in telephone directories or with poor English communication 
skills would not have been recruited. This is reflected in under-representation of people 
born outside Australia and people with less formal education in the final group. We 
would expect people with higher levels of education and stronger English language 
skills to be more likely to understand what is being asked of them and to feel confident 
in their ability to participate, making them more likely to take up the offer.  
 
Fourth, while ethnic diversity was sought through the recruitment category ‘born 
outside Australia,’ the participants did not fully reflect Australia’s ethnic diversity. 
Participants on the day observed that the group was predominantly ‘white’ and, 
although we did not collect specific data on language groups, it appeared that most of 
the people born overseas were of European origin. This raises questions about the most 
appropriate recruitment variable to use to capture ethnic diversity, and whether there are 
significant cultural barriers to participation in an event of this type even within a single 
country. A more diverse and representative result could potentially be achieved by 
setting quotas for specific language groups, or countries of origin. As Brackertz & 
Meredyth (2008: 16) suggest, increasing participation in relation to characteristics that 
pose a barrier to participation requires thinking about how and where members of these 
groups already come together, which existing information networks already exist, who 
they trust, who influences the group, and how other organisations facilitate access.  
 
However, this increases the time and cost for recruitment and potentially adds the need 
for interpreters, time to build relationships,  and time for learning about and 
communicating through existing networks—making it difficult for mini-publics that are 
often already stretched for resources and may not have been designed with adequate 
timelines for engagement of this nature. A further area of research for Australian events 
could be the framing during recruitment or designing of such events to increase 
participation of culturally and linguistically diverse participants. 
Fifth, as mentioned above, education levels represented at the event did not mirror the 
distribution within the population; there were proportionally more people with tertiary 
education and less with only some secondary education. Education levels can be a proxy 
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for ensuring socio-economic diversity and representation of a range of life experiences, 
including that of work. Interestingly, income and ‘types of work’ categories were still 
representative, and we achieved representation of a variety of household types, despite 
the under representation of participants with less formal education. 
 
The group that participated in WWViews did constitute a diverse cross-section of 
Australian society that was demographically representative in most categories. In those 
categories in which representation fell short of the quotas, it is reasonable to assume that 
representation was better than it would have been without the efforts to meet the quotas, 
although it is not possible to prove this. The participants themselves felt that the mini-
public was diverse; comments relating to diversity were one of the most frequent given 
to an open-ended ‘what did you like best about today?’ question posed at the end of the 
first half-day session. For example participants said: ‘Surprisingly brilliant job of 
mixing up the cross-section of participants, definitely added to the interest and diversity 
of discussion,’ ‘Meeting people from a range of areas and different points of views has 
been very insightful and interesting’ and ‘Lovely to meet such a diverse bunch of 
Australians.’ Nevertheless, the important exclusions identified above, most of which are 
typical of mini-publics, mean that WWViews fell short of an ideal of including the 
views of all stakeholders in climate change policy. 
 
Additional problems of inclusion and representativeness emerge as we turn our attention 
to the global scale. If achieving demographic representation is difficult at a national 
level, as outlined above, then it becomes even more challenging to bring together a 
group of participants that is reasonably representative of the world demographic profile. 
In WWViews, the approach taken to this challenge was to recruit a representative group 
of nations into the project and to ask each nation to identify a representative group of 
participants within that nation. Recruitment of nations was opportunistic, drawing on 
networks of deliberative democracy practitioners around the world and requiring 
organisations to source their own funding to run a national event. There was targeted 
recruitment of developing nations and specific efforts to secure funding to allow poorer 
countries to participate. In the end, 38 countries participated, including 18 developed 
and 20 developing nations. All continents were represented, but there were important 
regional gaps; most notably, despite attempts to identify suitable partner organisations, 
there was no participation from the Middle East or Central Asian countries.
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Apart from these gaps, the group of participating nations was reasonably representative 
of the diversity of world nations. It also included many of the major players in 
international climate change negotiations, such as the United States, China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa and several European Union members. However, it is questionable 
whether this model of national representation, closely paralleling the United Nations 
model, is the best way to achieve representativeness and inclusion at a global scale. To 
illustrate, China’s population of more than 1.3 billion and St Lucia’s population of 
170,000 were both represented by a single event, giving the views of St Lucians 
disproportionate weight when the global results were aggregated. 
 
A more representative model would be to seek to match the global pool of participants 
to a world demographic profile, using similar techniques to those described above for 
Australia. This may be an ideal to work towards but would pose substantial logistical 
difficulties to implement, with many countries lacking the detailed and comprehensive 
databases required to support such an approach. Although falling short of this ideal, an 
improvement over the WWViews approach would be to ensure that the number of 
participants from any country is proportional to the population they are representing 
and/or that the views expressed in particular events are weighted to take into account the 
population represented. These proposed changes to recruitment processes might 
improve global demographic representation but they would likely suffer from the same 
exclusions that we identified above for Australia. Thus we would expect low 
participation from the global poor, oppressed or linguistic minorities, young people and 
those with less formal education.  
 
A possible response is to reconceptualise what inclusion means in a deliberative 
democratic system. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010) argue that representation can be 
usefully conceived as representation of discourses. Diverse discourses exist on issues 
like climate change and ensuring that all of these discourses are represented in a mini-
public may be a more practically inclusive approach than seeking demographic 
representation.  
 
For example, if there are concerns about directly including children in a mini-public, 
adult participants could be recruited that can represent the discourses in which children 
participate. Further, participants could be recruited to represent the discourses of unborn 
future generations who cannot possibly participate in a current mini-public but have the 
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greatest stake in climate change response. The marginalised discourses of the global 
poor and disadvantaged can be brought into a mini-public through specific discourse 
representation rather than simple demographic weight of numbers. 
 
While the concept of discourse representation is an attractive one, more work is needed 
to investigate the practical implications for design of mini-publics and the balance 
between demographic representation and discourse representation. There are important 
questions about how discourses requiring representation would be identified, how 
representatives of these discourses would be selected and who should make these 
decisions. These questions would themselves be suitable topics for deliberation. 
 
WWViews did not make any attempt to identify the discourses that would need to be 
represented in a mini-public on global climate change response. Nor did it attempt to 
identify the discourses that participants adhered to. Consequently, it is not possible to 
evaluate whether WWViews achieved a reasonable level of discourse representation. 
We can state, however, that participants in WWViews in Australia and internationally 
exhibited greater levels of concern about climate change and called for stronger action 
than is typical in public debate as revealed through the media or opinion polling (Danish 
Board of Technology 2009b). This may indicate that the WWViews mini-publics did 
not have sufficient representation from diverse discourses as a starting point, or that 
substantial shifts occurred through the process of deliberation. It is to the quality of 
deliberation that we now turn. 
 
Authentic deliberation 
The process should support communicative freedom by providing access to information, 
space for open and respectful dialogue between participants and sufficient time for 
reflection. It should encourage but not coerce reflection on preferences. 
 
Gundersen (1995) describes deliberation as an active process of challenging 
unconsidered beliefs and values, encouraging individuals to arrive at a defensible 
position on an issue. For Dryzek (2002: 1), it is a non-coercive, reflective and pluralistic 
process, allowing ‘argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or storytelling, and 
gossip,’ through which people arrive at a particular judgement, preference or view. For 
Carson and Hartz-Karp (2005: 122), as noted previously, deliberation requires ‘open 
dialogue, access to information, respect, space to understand and reframe issues, and 
movement toward consensus.’ 
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Numerous engagement methods are now available for facilitating deliberation by mini-
publics (Fung 2003; Smith, G. 2009). WWViews used a hybrid method that drew on the 
DBT’s several decades of experience in engaging citizens in deliberation within 
political decision-making processes. The method combined elements of deliberative 
opinion polling (Fishkin 1997), the 21st Century Town Meeting process developed by 
America Speaks5 and the Voting Conference process used by the Danish Board of 
Technology.6 Partner organisations were given opportunities to contribute to the 
development of the WWViews method, which was then documented in a Process 
Manual (Danish Board of Technology 2009a) that all national partners were expected to 
follow. 
 
Participants in each country were provided with information to support informed 
deliberation in the form of written material prior to the event and video presentations 
during the event. They were divided into small groups around a table, each with a 
facilitator. The groups discussed a series of pre-established questions directly relevant to 
the COP15 negotiations in four themed deliberation sessions. Facilitators provided 
participants with space to express and defend their views and gently encouraged them to 
question their existing beliefs and those of other participants at their table. At the end of 
each themed session, participants chose their preferred response to each question from a 
set of pre-established choices. In a final session, the groups at each table collectively 
wrote a recommendation to their climate negotiators through a process of consensus 
building. All participants then voted on their favourite recommendations from those 
developed by each group. 
 
No attempt was made to systematically measure the quality of the deliberation in the 
WWViews Australia event, although methods such as the Discourse Quality Index 
(Steenbergen et al. 2003) are available for this purpose. However, it is clear that the 
process supported more deliberation than the participants would normally engage in on 
climate change by providing them with information and a facilitated space to engage 
with other views, consider questions they would not normally consider, and reflect on 
their own preferences. In a survey of participants, 99 percent felt that the 
recommendation developed by their group reflected an open and thoughtful discussion 
                                                
5 See: www.americaspeaks.org [Accessed 1 Sep. 2011]. 
6 See: http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=469&toppic=kategori12&language=dk [Accessed 1 
Sep. 2011].  
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based on diverse views from a diverse group of people (Atherton & Herriman 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, the process could have been more deliberative in some important ways. 
To make efficient use of limited time and to allow easy quantitative comparison of 
results across different countries, the four themed sessions required participants to 
express their views by voting on a set of predefined questions with multiple-choice 
answers. The use of predefined questions and answers closed down opportunities for 
participants to reframe issues or express responses in their own words. The limited set 
of available responses may not have adequately reflected the real diversity of opinion 
within the participating group. In addition, the voting process resorted to aggregation of 
views rather than seeking to move discussions towards consensus. This meant that 
participants could opt out of reflecting on their views or having them challenged by 
other participants, as they did not have to participate in reaching a consensus. These 
process limitations were consciously addressed through the inclusion of the final session 
in which participants worked together in small groups to develop a recommendation to 
the COP-15 delegates. This process did encourage consensus and allowed participants 
to express themselves in their own words. 
 
A second point to note is the impact of the pace of the deliberations. The process 
established by the DBT in consultation with partner organisations encouraged national 
organisers to fit the entire process into a single day. Again, this was meant to maximise 
the issues that could be covered while keeping costs down to make the process more 
accessible around the world. For the Australian event, we added an extra half-day to the 
process to provide more time for deliberation. However, each deliberation and voting 
session only allowed 45 minutes for participants to discuss the information provided, 
the questions and the possible responses. This is not sufficient time to fully reflect on 
and think through the consequences of decisions. This is perhaps echoed in some of the 
voting results. For example, 31 percent of Australian participants supported greenhouse 
gas reduction targets of more than 40 percent by 2020. Such targets would have a 
substantial impact on energy prices and bills in Australia. Although table facilitators 
relayed many participants’ stories of weighing up the personal impacts of increased 
prices versus their responsibilities to future generations, it is unlikely that all 
participants had time to make these personal connections to an issue; those that did 
would have had little specific information on the magnitude of personal impacts. 
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Making such connections was further hindered by the decision to focus all of the 
information provided to participants on the international negotiations. Provision of 
country-specific information was not allowed. This decision was made both to reduce 
time requirements and to ensure that participants from around the world received the 
same information to inform their deliberation. However, there is strong evidence that 
people are more able to connect with the issue of climate change and more likely to 
change their behaviour if they see it as a tangible, local issue, rather than an abstract, 
global issue (CRED 2009). In addition, the implications of international decisions only 
become apparent by shifting focus to the national level. Participants in WWViews had 
no opportunity to reflect and deliberate on how their decisions would play out in their 
own countries and the results are consistent with low awareness of national and local 
impacts. Future global-scale deliberative democracy processes on climate change will 
need to find ways to connect issues across scales, from global to local and vice versa. 
 
The difficult question that needs to be asked here is whether bigger is necessarily better 
for global mini-publics. The choice to use standardised questions and responses, to limit 
the length of the event and to avoid country-specific discussions certainly reduced costs 
and allowed countries to participate that would not have been able to do so otherwise, 
but deliberative quality was sacrificed to achieve this. While in Australia we have 
anecdotal evidence that the scale of the project gave it a point of difference when trying 
to get the attention of decision makers (and potential funders), it is unknown whether 
the sheer number of people and countries involved made the project any more 
influential. A longer, smaller process, perhaps prioritising good discourse representation 
rather than number of participants, could have delivered greater deliberative quality 
without sacrificing the potential to influence. 
 
The organisers also justified standardisation of the questions, answers and process as a 
way of supporting comparability of the results across participating countries. We 
question whether comparability is sufficiently important to justify the resulting loss of 
deliberative quality. Indeed, we question whether comparability is even possible across 
different cultural and linguistic contexts. In the case of WWViews, all the decisions 
made to achieve comparability and standardisation were undermined by allowing 
(appropriately) local translation of the information materials and local design of 
participant recruitment processes. We contend that authentic deliberation requires 
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process flexibility to account for differences in culture, resources, democratic tradition 
and political system (Dryzek 2011). For example, different cultures have different 
expectations about regularity of breaks, allowing time for religious practices and how 
men and women should interact. A more flexible and culturally responsive process 
would have delivered greater deliberative quality without having to sacrifice potential 
for comparability or influence. Our final evaluative discussion addresses this question of 
influence. 
 
Influence and consequence 
The process should develop the communicative power to make a difference, whether by 
influencing policy and decision-making or facilitating broader sociocultural change 
(e.g. new discourses or networks). 
 
A starting point for evaluating the influence of a mini-public is to understand what 
influence the project sought to achieve. Ostensibly, WWViews sought to influence the 
outcomes of COP-15 and measured against this ambitious aim it was a failure. The 
outcomes of COP-15 fell far short of what the participating citizens demanded and there 
is no evidence that WWViews had any influence on negotiating positions at COP-15. In 
reality, most of the organisers had more modest aims for the project. In Australia, we 
certainly sought to influence the positions held by politicians and other decision-makers 
in relation to climate change, but we also sought to build discursive awareness of 
deliberative democracy and the potential of mini-publics. There is no definitive 
evidence that the former objective was achieved, but there is some evidence that the 
latter was achieved.  
 
As noted above, WWViews Australia developed a dissemination strategy that sought to 
influence politicians, bureaucrats and the media to adopt the positions advocated by the 
mini-public. We sought face-to-face meetings with Australian Government climate 
policy-makers and negotiators, other influential bureaucrats, and politicians from the 
three major political parties (the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal-National Coalition, 
and the Greens). Gaining access to key politicians and climate change negotiators 
during the period of the dissemination efforts (Oct.–Nov. 2009) was difficult. Key 
individuals had limited availability due to the demands on their time of preparation for 
COP-15 (including attending preparatory talks elsewhere) and the (thwarted) passage 
through Federal Parliament of domestic climate change policy. Meetings were 
ultimately held with public servants in the Department of Climate Change (one of 
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whom was on the COP-15 negotiating team), some advisers to Ministers and Shadow 
Ministers, the Australian Greens Deputy Leader and the Lord Mayor of Sydney 
(Herriman, White & Atherton 2011). Reports were also mailed to all Federal politicians 
(both Houses), all State Government Ministers and selected State Government MPs, and 
senior Federal and State civil servants, including Federal climate negotiators. 
 
While we hope that at least some of the politicians that received reports read them and 
are now a little bit more familiar with deliberative mini-publics, there is no evidence in 
the public domain that WWViews Australia had any influence at all on their views on 
how to respond to climate change. If anything, the views expressed by politicians now 
are less consistent with the outcomes of WWViews than they were at the time it was 
held, as the politics of climate change in Australia has become more partisan and 
oppositional in the intervening period. Further evaluation of the influence of WWViews 
would require investigative research with key politicians and decision-makers, which 
has not been undertaken. 
 
The lack of apparent influence on climate change policy is perhaps not surprising, and it 
could be argued, in hindsight, that the strategies that the global project established and 
that we employed in the Australian context were politically naïve. First, we assumed 
that it would be possible to influence negotiating positions two months out from COP-
15, when these positions had already firmed through the preceding ten months of 
negotiations. Second, we assumed that a one-off event like WWViews could create 
enough noise in the public space to hold those occupying empowered space accountable. 
In reality, sustained pressure over a longer period is more likely to deliver 
communicative power. WWViews did not even deliver enough communicative power 
to secure meetings with some of the key participants in empowered space, let alone to 
influence their positions. 
 
The conversion of communicative freedom to communicative power is a critical 
challenge if mini-publics are to achieve any influence within deliberative systems. 
Deliberative theorists tend to underplay the difficulty of challenging existing power 
structures (Brassett & Smith 2010) and there has been little thinking to date about how 
mini-publics can be designed to increase their likelihood of achieving influence. As 
noted above, one of the key strategies for making WWViews an influential and 
consequential project was to maximise the credibility and perceived legitimacy of the 
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event with policy makers through rigorous standardisation and broad participation. The 
intent was to make the WWViews method above reproach and the weight of numbers 
compelling. Unfortunately, as also noted above, deliberative quality was sacrificed in 
favour of this model of influence, yet it is doubtful that either standardisation or the 
numbers involved delivered any more influence. 
 
One of the reasons that standardisation is unlikely to help to deliver greater influence is 
that different countries have substantially different political systems and, as a result, the 
appropriate role for mini-publics differs across countries (Dryzek 2011). Dryzek (2011) 
distinguishes between four different types of state based on their orientation to social 
interests; that is, whether they include or exclude interests, and whether they do so 
actively or passively. The path to achieve influence is very different in each type of state. 
Actively inclusive states, like Denmark, work to create formal channels for public 
participation in decision-making, including mini-publics. There is a tradition of public 
deliberation and decision-makers are expected to heed the results of mini-publics. In 
contrast, in a pluralist (passive-inclusive) state like the USA (or Australia), there are few 
formal opportunities for participation but all are free to advocate their interests and 
achieve influence. Being heard above the resulting clamour is difficult. Any voice, 
including that of a mini-public, becomes just another voice at the bargaining table; there 
is limited potential for influence unless this voice is loud and persists over time, which 
is rare for mini-publics. The pathways to influence are different again in exclusive states.  
 
WWViews did not take into account these political differences in its process design. 
Rather, the design was modelled on processes that work well in actively inclusive 
Denmark but may be less suited to other types of state. Future attempts to convene 
global mini-publics would do well to avoid standardisation in favour of developing 
country-specific deliberative designs that are tailored to achieving the type of influence 
that is appropriate in each country. 
 
While there is no evidence that WWViews Australia influenced the positions taken by 
decision-makers, there is some tentative evidence that it did contribute to a stronger 
discourse on deliberative democracy in Australia. Television, radio and print media 
covered the event, nationally and locally, exposing new audiences to the idea of 
deliberative democracy. The Lord Mayor of Sydney, after a meeting about WWViews, 
went on to chair a session on citizen participation at the Copenhagen Mayors’ Summit 
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during COP-15. Finally, in her 2010 election campaign, the Australian Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard announced plans for a Citizens’ Assembly on climate change (Morton & 
Arup 2010), which would have been the first time the Australian Government had 
convened a mini-public to directly inform policy. Given the work done to inform 
politicians about WWViews, it is possible (although not proven) that communication 
about WWViews helped to make the idea of convening a mini-public sufficiently 
plausible for a political announcement. Unfortunately, the plan was later abandoned 
following media and public criticism (Franklin 2010), so it seems there is a long way to 
go before mini-publics become an accepted part of the Australian political landscape. 
 
Conclusion: The future of global mini-publics 
The outcome of our evaluation of WWViews is decidedly mixed. The event was 
delivered with integrity, was reasonably successful at bringing together a representative 
group of citizens from around the world to deliberate, and received substantial media 
and practitioner attention. WWViews demonstrated that it is feasible to convene a 
global mini-public and that citizens are capable of deliberating on complex global issues. 
For the Australian organisers and participants, feedback on the event was almost 
universally positive. 
 
On the other hand, as a transient event, its contribution towards the emergence of a 
global deliberative system for climate change response was limited and it achieved little 
influence on global climate change policy. In part, this was due to the lack of attention 
to appropriate pathways and strategies for achieving influence in different countries. 
The quality of deliberation was compromised by attempts at standardisation that seem 
misguided in light of cultural and political differences between the participating 
countries. Despite these negatives, we continue to believe that global mini-publics can 
make a contribution towards a more deliberative global governance system on climate 
change and other issues. Future global mini-publics have the opportunity to learn from 
WWViews, so it is worth summarising the key lessons here. 
 
First, if a mini-public is to contribute towards a global deliberative system then the 
quality of deliberation is paramount. This means that events must allow sufficient time 
for reflection on preferences and that methods relying on voting on pre-determined 
responses should be avoided. Participants should be given as much opportunity as 
possible to frame issues in their own terms, formulate their own responses and express 
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these in their own words. 
 
Second, representing discourse diversity instead of, or in addition to, a demographic 
profile may be a more appropriate goal for mini-publics, particularly at a global scale. 
Identifying the discourses that need to be included and finding suitable discourse 
representatives will be challenging but potentially offers a more feasible pathway to 
legitimacy for global mini-publics. Further, through discourse representation it may be 
possible to find innovative ways to use special representatives to incorporate the 
presumed discourses of future generations, or even other species. 
 
Third, where global mini-publics are made up of smaller national mini-publics, 
flexibility to respond to cultural and political differences is critical. Mini-publics are 
more likely to deliver authentic deliberation and to achieve influence if they have 
freedom to respond to the local cultural and systemic context, even if this means the 
results from different countries are not directly comparable. Strategic thinking about 
how best to achieve political influence needs to be at the heart of mini-public design. 
 
Fourth, mini-publics may be more likely to achieve influence if they are long and loud, 
forcing empowered space to be accountable. One-off events can potentially be loud, in 
that they may get a lot of media attention, but the effect quickly dissipates without 
sustained action. Processes that bring mini-publics back together for multiple events 
over a longer period of time have greater potential to build discursive momentum and 
influence empowered space. In other words, designers of mini-publics need to consider 
their role in building a movement for change that can accrue sufficient communicative 
power to force a response.    
 
Finally, there are many other ways in which a global mini-public could be convened and 
these need to be explored. WWViews essentially mimicked the United Nations system 
by convening discrete mini-publics at a national scale and simply aggregating national 
results. An alternative way to convene a global mini-public would be to involve 
participants from across the globe in a single process, where the views of the rich can be 
challenged by those of the poor and the full global implications of decisions become 
clear. WWViews insulated participants in each country from each other, missing an 
opportunity for cross-cultural deliberation. 
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Global mini-publics are certainly not the only way to democratise systems of global 
governance, or even the only way to bring more deliberation into global governance. 
There is space for more deliberation in all elements of the global deliberative system, 
whether through new permanent or temporary institutions, reform of existing 
institutions, or the messy debates of global civil society. What is critical, if we are to 
develop governance systems that can effectively respond to climate change, is that we 
continue to experiment with diverse approaches to democratisation and learn from the 
successes and failures.  
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